NGINX Plus FIPS Compliance

What is FIPS

The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS), issued by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), defines mandatory security requirements for cryptographic modules used in federal IT systems. FIPS 140-2, and its successor FIPS 140-3, establish strict standards to protect sensitive information, including government communications and citizen data.

Why FIPS-140 matters

FIPS 140 is a mandatory cryptographic standard in the United States and Canada for federal agencies, their contractors, and many regulated industries.

Non-compliance can result to contract loss, restricted project access, fines, or, in severe cases, data breaches compromising personal information or national security.

Some industries such as finance, healthcare, energy, also adopt FIPS to enhance data protection and operational security.

FIPS compliance in U.S.

Currently, both FIPS 140-2 and FIPS 140-3 certifications are accepted. However, FIPS 140-2 is being phased out as part of the FIPS 140-3 transition plan. After September 22, 2026, only FIPS 140-3 certifications will be recognized. Organizations are encouraged to migrate to FIPS 140-3 to meet updated cryptographic security requirements.

Program/Regulation/Industry FIPS 140-2/140-3 Requirement Current Status
CJIS 140-2 or 140-3 FIPS required for systems protecting criminal justice data.
CMMC 140-2 or 140-3 FIPS required for Levels 2 and 3 compliance.
Common Criteria 140-2 or 140-3 Evaluations reference both FIPS versions for cryptographic security.
Critical Infrastructure 140-2 or 140-3 Utilities and systems accept both versions depending on deployments.
Department of Veterans Affairs 140-2 or 140-3 Both versions used for securing sensitive health and personal data.
DFARS 140-2 or 140-3 Cryptographic modules for CUI must be FIPS compliant.
DoDIN APL 140-2 or 140-3 Approved IT products must include FIPS validation.
FAA 140-2 transitioning to 140-3 140-2 modules common in existing systems; new systems use 140-3.
FERPA 140-2 or 140-3 Federal-funded educational systems align with 140-2 or 140-3.
FedRAMP 140-2 or 140-3 FIPS required for encryption; both versions accepted.
FISMA 140-2 or 140-3 Both versions accepted; agencies adopt existing 140-2 modules.
HIPAA 140-2 or 140-3 FIPS ensures encryption for ePHI; both versions are valid.
HITECH 140-2 or 140-3 FIPS use aligns with encryption best practices for ePHI.
Intelligence Community 140-2 transitioning to 140-3 Current systems mostly use 140-2; newer systems adopt 140-3.
Military & Tactical Systems 140-2 transitioning to 140-3 140-2 used widely; transitioning to 140-3 certifications for future tools.
NSA CSfC 140-2 transitioning to 140-3 NSA accepts 140-2 but prefers newer certifications under 140-3.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 140-2 or 140-3 Cryptography for nuclear systems relies on both versions.
PCI DSS 140-2 or 140-3 Both versions recommended but not mandatory.
State and Local Gov Programs 140-2 or 140-3 FIPS required for federal grant-funded security systems.
TSA 140-2 or 140-3 Best practice for cryptographic protection; both versions accepted.

FIPS compliance in other countries

Although FIPS 140 is primarily a North American government cryptographic standard, it is widely recognized as a global benchmark for cryptographic security. Numerous countries outside North America align their cryptographic requirements with FIPS, especially in regulated sectors such as finance, defense, healthcare, and critical infrastructure.

Country/Region FIPS Use
Australia Referenced for government, defense, and cryptography systems.
Canada Mandatory for federal and sensitive systems.
Denmark Referenced in finance, healthcare, and NATO communications.
Estonia Adopted for e-governance and critical systems.
Finland Relied on for defense and NATO communications.
France Relied on for defense and secure systems.
Germany Relied on for defense, critical infrastructure, and NATO communications.
Israel Trusted in defense, government, and financial systems.
Italy Relied on for defense and financial cryptography.
Japan Referenced in government and financial cryptographic practices.
Netherlands Referenced in finance, healthcare, and NATO communications.
New Zealand Referenced for government and national cryptography.
Poland Relied on for secure government and NATO communications.
Spain Referenced in NATO communications and critical systems.
Sweden Relied on for defense and secure NATO communications.
UAE Trusted in finance, energy, and interoperability with the U.S. cryptography.
United Kingdom Referenced for defense, health, and procurement standards.
United States Mandatory for federal government systems and contractors.

FIPS compliant vs FIPS validated

FIPS validation is a formal multistep process that certifies cryptographic modules through testing under the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). The process is managed by the NIST and requires accredited third-party laboratories to evaluate the cryptographic module. Once a module passes validation, it is officially recognized as FIPS-validated (FIPS-certified).

FIPS compliance indicates that a system or a module claims to meet the FIPS requirements, however, it has not been officially tested or certified under the CMVP program.

FIPS compliance with NGINX Plus

NGINX Plus is FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and FIPS 140-3 Level 1 compliant, provided that the operating system and the OpenSSL library are operating in FIPS mode.

NGINX Plus relies exclusively on the operating system’s FIPS-validated OpenSSL library for all SSL/TLS, HTTP/2, and HTTP/3 encryption and decryption operations.

FIPS compliance with NGINX Open Source

While NGINX Plus is tested to work on FIPS-enabled operating systems in FIPS mode, NGINX Open Source is not verified for such environments, especially when third-party builds or modules implementing custom cryptographic functions are used.

Compiling NGINX Open Source for FIPS mode may also require additional OS-level dependencies beyond its core requirements, potentially introducing unintended risks. Organizations should consult their security and compliance teams to ensure their configurations meet FIPS requirements.

FIPS validation of operating systems

Several operating system vendors have obtained FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and 140-3 Level 1 validation for the OpenSSL Cryptographic Module included with their respective operating systems:

You also can verify whether your operating system or cryptographic module is FIPS-validated using the NIST database search tool.

Verification of correct operation of NGINX Plus

The following process describes how to deploy NGINX Plus in a FIPS‑compliant environment and verify that the FIPS operations are functioning correctly. It involves three basic steps:

  • Verify if the operating system is running in FIPS mode. If not, configure it to enable FIPS mode.

  • Verify that the OpenSSL library is operating in FIPS mode.

  • Run basic checks for OpenSSL and NGINX Plus to confirm deployment in FIPS mode.

The process uses Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) release 9.6 as an example and can be adapted for other Linux operating systems that can be configured in FIPS mode.

Step 1: Configure the operating system to use FIPS mode

For the purposes of the following demonstration, we installed and configured a RHEL 9.6 server. The Red Hat FIPS documentation explains how to switch the operating system between FIPS mode and non‑FIPS mode by editing the boot options and restarting the system.

For instructions for enabling FIPS mode on other FIPS‑compliant Linux operating systems, see the operating system documentation, for example:

Step 2: Verify the operating system is in FIPS mode

You can verify that the operating system is in FIPS mode and that the version of OpenSSL provided by the operating system vendor is FIPS‑compliant by using the following tests.

Check operating system flags: When the operating system is in FIPS mode, crypto.fips_enabled kernlel flag is 1; otherwise, it is 0:

sudo sysctl -a | grep fips

The output of the command shows that FIPS is enabled at the kernel level:

crypto.fips_enabled = 1
crypto.fips_name = Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 - Kernel Cryptographic API
crypto.fips_version = 5.14.0-570.39.1.el9_6.aarch64

Check kernel logs for FIPS algorithm registration:

journalctl -k -o cat -g alg:

The output of the command verifies the status of algorithm self-tests and whether certain algorithms are registered, passed FIPS self-tests, or are disabled due to FIPS mode being active:

alg: self-tests for pkcs1pad(rsa-generic,sha512) (pkcs1pad(rsa,sha512)) passed
alg: self-tests for pkcs1pad(rsa-generic,sha256) (pkcs1pad(rsa,sha256)) passed
alg: self-tests for cbc-aes-ce (cbc(aes)) passed
alg: self-tests for jitterentropy_rng (jitterentropy_rng) passed
alg: poly1305 (poly1305-neon) is disabled due to FIPS
alg: xchacha12 (xchacha12-neon) is disabled due to FIPS
alg: xchacha20 (xchacha20-neon) is disabled due to FIPS

Beyond kernel-level verification, you can ensure that the whole operating system environment is configured for FIPS compliance:

sudo fips-mode-setup --check

The output of the command shows that FIPS is running:

FIPS mode is enabled.

Step 3: Verify the OpenSSL is in FIPS mode

Determine the OpenSSL FIPS Provider is active: This test verifies the correct version of OpenSSL and that the OpenSSL FIPS Provider is active:

openssl list -providers | grep -A3 fips

The output of the command shows the FIPS provider status:

  fips
    name: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 - OpenSSL FIPS Provider
    version: 3.0.7-395c1a240fbfffd8
    status: active

Determine whether OpenSSL can perform SHA1 hashes: This test verifies the correct operation of OpenSSL. The SHA-1 hash algorithm, while considered weak, is still permitted in FIPS mode as it is included in FIPS-approved standards for certain legacy use cases. Failure of this command indicates that the OpenSSL implementation is not working properly:

openssl sha1 /dev/null

The result of the command, showing the SHA1 checksum of /dev/null:

SHA1(/dev/null)= da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709

Determine whether OpenSSL allows MD5 hashes: This test verifies that OpenSSL is running in FIPS mode. MD5 is not a permitted hash algorithm in FIPS mode, so an attempt to use it fails:

openssl md5 /dev/null

The result of the command:

Error setting digest
200458BAFFFF0000:error:0308010C:digital envelope routines:inner_evp_generic_fetch:unsupported:crypto/evp/evp_fetch.c:355:Global default library context, Algorithm (MD5 : 95), Properties ()
200458BAFFFF0000:error:03000086:digital envelope routines:evp_md_init_internal:initialization error:crypto/evp/digest.c:272:

If OpenSSL is not running in FIPS mode, the MD5 hash functions normally:

openssl md5 /dev/null

The result of the command, showing the MD5 checksum of /dev/null:

MD5(/dev/null)= d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e

Step 4: Install NGINX Plus on the operating system

Follow the F5 NGINX Plus Installation guide to install NGINX Plus on the host operating system, either directly from the NGINX Plus repository, or by downloading the nginx-plus package (rpm or deb package) onto another system and manually installing it on the host operating system.

Verify that NGINX Plus is correctly installed: Run the following command to confirm that NGINX Plus is installed and is using the expected OpenSSL cryptographic module:

nginx -V

Sample output from the command:

shell
nginx version: nginx/1.29.0 (nginx-plus-r35)
built by gcc 11.5.0 20240719 (Red Hat 11.5.0-5) (GCC) 
built with OpenSSL 3.2.2 4 Jun 2024

Note that OpenSSL 1.0.x might include the –fips suffix to indicate that the library was linked with a FIPS-validated module, but it did not confirm that the library was operating in FIPS mode. Starting with OpenSSL 3.0, the concept of Providers was introduced, allowing explicit verification of FIPS validation by listing providers with the openssl list -providers | grep fips command.

Configure NGINX Plus to serve a simple SSL/TLS‑protected website: Add the following simple configuration to NGINX Plus:

nginx
server {
    listen 443 ssl;

    ssl_certificate     /etc/nginx/ssl/test.crt;
    ssl_certificate_key /etc/nginx/ssl/test.key;

    location / {
        root   /usr/share/nginx/html;
        index  index.html index.htm;
    }
}

If necessary, you can generate a self‑signed certificate for test purposes:

shell
mkdir -p /etc/nginx/ssl && \
openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout /etc/nginx/ssl/test.key -x509 -days 365 -out /etc/nginx/ssl/test.crt

Verify that you can access the website using HTTPS from a remote host. Connect to the NGINX IP address using the openssl s_client command, and enter the HTTP message GET /:

(echo "GET /" ; sleep 1) | openssl s_client -connect <NGINX-Plus-address>:443

Use openssl s_client for this test because it unambiguously confirms which SSL/TLS cipher was negotiated in the connection. After some debugging information (including the cipher selected), the body of the default “Welcome to nginx!” greeting page is displayed.

Step 5: Verify compliance with FIPS

FIPS 140-2 and 140-3 disallows the use of some cryptographic algorithms, including the Camellia block cipher. In addition to FIPS 140-2, FIPS 140-3 disallows the use of several ciphers and algorithms that were once allowed or still allowed under FIPS 140-2.

You can test compliance with FIPS 140-2 / 140-3 by issuing SSL/TLS requests with known ciphers on another (non-FIPS-mode) server:

RC4-MD5

RC4-MD5 is considered insecure and deprecated across all modern cryptographic standards. It is disallowed and disabled by default in FIPS-compliant OpenSSL, and TLS 1.2 and 1.3. The SSL handshake always fails.

(echo "GET /" ; sleep 1) | openssl s_client -connect <NGINX-Plus-address>:443 -cipher RC4-MD5

For FIPS compliance, alternative cipher suites can be used such as:

  • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

CAMELLIA-SHA

(echo "GET /" ; sleep 1) | openssl s_client -connect <NGINX-Plus-address>:443 -cipher CAMELLIA256-SHA

This cipher is considered secure but is not permitted by the FIPS standard. The SSL handshake fails if the target system is compliant with FIPS 140-2 /140-3, and succeeds otherwise.

AES256-SHA

The cipher is permitted under FIPS 140-2 as it combines AES encryption with SHA-1. However, under FIPS 140-3, SHA-1 is explicitly disallowed due to its vulnerabilities, such as susceptibility to collision attacks. As a result, the SSL handshake fails under FIPS 140-3 and succeeds under FIPS 140-2:

(echo "GET /" ; sleep 1) | openssl s_client -connect <NGINX-Plus-address>:443 -cipher AES256-SHA

For FIPS 140-3 compliance, alternative cipher suites that leverage SHA-2 or SHA-3 for hashing can be used:

  • AES-GCM-Based Cipher Suites (TLS 1.2):

    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
    • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • ChaCha20-Based Cipher Suites (TLS 1.2 or 1.3):

    • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
  • TLS 1.3 Cipher Suites:

    • TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
    • TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
    • TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

3DES

The 3DES (Triple DES) cipher is allowed under FIPS 140-2, but disallowed under FIPS 140-3. NIST deprecated its use starting January 1, 2024 due to its reduced security strength (112 bits) and vulnerability to brute-force attacks.

As a result, the SSL handshake always fails in FIPS-3 compliant environment:

(echo "GET /" ; sleep 1) | openssl s_client -connect <NGINX-Plus-address>:443 -cipher DES-CBC3

For FIPS 140-3 compliance, AES-Based or ChaCha20-Based cipher suites can be used:

  • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
  • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

DH and DSA

Under FIPS 140-2, Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) were permitted with a minimum key size of 1024 bits. However, under FIPS 140-3, the minimum key size for both DH and DSA has been increased to 2048 bits.

For example, the TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA algorithm is FIPS 140-2 compliant, but not FIPS 140-3 compliant due to its use of DH with a key size of less than 2048 bits, CBC mode encryption, and SHA-1 hashing:

(echo "GET /" ; sleep 1) | openssl s_client -connect <NGINX-Plus-address>:443 -cipher TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

The TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 algorithm is FIPS 140-3 compliant as it uses Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE), AES-GCM for encryption, and SHA-256 for hashing:

(echo "GET /" ; sleep 1) | openssl s_client -connect <NGINX-Plus-address>:443 -cipher  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

Ciphers disabled in FIPS Mode

The FIPS 140-2 standard only permits a subset of the typical SSL and TLS ciphers, while FIPS 140-3 extends this requirements to enforce stricter cryptographic algorithms.

In the following test, the ciphers presented by NGINX Plus are surveyed using the nmap utility (installed separately). In its default configuration, with the ssl_ciphers HIGH:!aNULL:!MD5 directive, NGINX Plus presents the following ciphers to SSL/TLS clients:

nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 <NGINX-Plus-address>

The output of the command for NGINX Plus running on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 without FIPS enabled:

shell
PORT    STATE SERVICE
443/tcp open  https
| ssl-enum-ciphers: 
|   TLSv1.2: 
|     ciphers: 
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (rsa 2048) - A
|       TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 (rsa 2048) - A
|     compressors: 
|       NULL
|     cipher preference: client
|   TLSv1.3: 
|     ciphers: 
|       TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A
|       TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A
|       TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (ecdh_x25519) - A
|       TLS_AKE_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (ecdh_x25519) - A
|     cipher preference: client
|_  least strength: A

When FIPS 140-3 mode is enabled, NGINX Plus presents the following ciphers to SSL/TLS clients:

shell
PORT    STATE SERVICE
443/tcp open  https
| ssl-enum-ciphers: 
|   TLSv1.2: 
|     ciphers: 
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (secp256r1) - A
|     compressors: 
|       NULL
|     cipher preference: client
|   TLSv1.3: 
|     ciphers: 
|       TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (secp256r1) - A
|       TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (secp256r1) - A
|     cipher preference: client
|_  least strength: A

Based on the results above, the following ciphers are disallowed under FIPS 140-3 compliance:

  • Camellia-Based Ciphers: FIPS compliance requires cryptographic algorithms to be validated by NIST, and Camellia is not NIST-approved despite being recognized by ISO/IEC standards.

    • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
    • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
  • ARIA-Based Ciphers: similar to Camellia, ARIA is not a NIST-approved algorithm and is therefore excluded from FIPS compliance.

    • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
    • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
  • RSA Key Exchange Ciphers: static RSA key exchange lacks Forward Secrecy, allowing decryption of past traffic if the private key is compromised, thus disallowed in FIPS mode.

    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
  • CBC Mode Ciphers (Non-AEAD: CBC is vulnerable to padding oracle attacks (e.g., POODLE, Lucky13), making it insecure. FIPS 140-3 prioritizes AEAD modes like AES-GCM and AES-CCM.

    • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
    • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
  • ChaCha20-Poly1305: it is not a NIST-approved algorithm and is excluded from FIPS compliance. FIPS exclusively permits algorithms such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM.

    • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
  • AES-CCM Variants:

    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
    • TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM

You can also use the Qualys SSL server test to verify the ciphers presented by NGINX Plus to SSL/TLS clients.

Conclusion

NGINX Plus can be used to decrypt and encrypt SSL/TLS‑encrypted network traffic in deployments that require FIPS 140-2 Level 1 or FIPS 140-3 Level 1 compliance.

The process described above may be used to verify that NGINX Plus is operating in conformance with the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and FIPS 140-3 Level 1 standards.

Definition of terms

  • Cryptographic module: The OpenSSL software, comprised of libraries of FIPS‑validated algorithms that can be used by other applications.

  • Cryptographic boundary: The operational functions that use FIPS‑validated algorithms. For NGINX Plus, the cryptographic boundary includes all functionality that is implemented by the http_auth_jwt, http_ssl, http_v2, http_v3, mail_ssl, and stream_ssl modules. These modules implement SSL and TLS operations for inbound and outbound connections which use HTTP, HTTP/2, HTTP/3, TCP, and mail protocols.

  • NGINX Plus: The NGINX Plus software application developed by F5, Inc. and delivered in binary format from F5 servers.

  • FIPS mode: When the operating system is configured to run in FIPS mode, the OpenSSL cryptographic module operates in a mode that has been validated to be in compliance with FIPS 140-2 Level 1 or FIPS 140-3 Level 1. Most operating systems do not run in FIPS mode by default, so explicit configuration is necessary to enable FIPS mode.

  • FIPS validated: A component of the OpenSSL cryptographic module (the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module) is formally validated by an authorized certification laboratory. The validation holds if the module is built from source with no modifications to the source or build process. The implementation of FIPS mode that is present in operating system vendors’ distributions of OpenSSL contains this validated module.

  • FIPS compliant: NGINX Plus is compliant with FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and FIPS 140-3 Level 1 within the cryptographic boundary when used with a FIPS‑validated OpenSSL cryptographic module on an operating system running in FIPS mode.

See also:

FIPS 140-3 Standard in the PDF format

FIPS compliance with NGINX Plus and Red Hat Enterprise Linux

F5 NGINX Plus running on Red Hat Enterprise Linux is now FIPS 140-3 compliant